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
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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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State Dept. review completed

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
SUMMARY

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FAR EAST

1. Foreign policy differences loom as obstacle to Japanese conservative merger:

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[REDACTED] Fundamental foreign policy differences between Prime Minister Hatoyama and the opposition Liberals led by former prime minister Yoshida and former deputy prime minister Ogata have recently become serious enough to hamper efforts for a merger of the conservative parties.

In Ambassador Allison's opinion, Hatoyama genuinely believes that "one-sided" dependence on the United States is not in Japan's best interests and that ties must be established with the Sino-Soviet bloc to achieve a balance. Hatoyama told the Diet on 10 May that he was determined to conclude talks with the USSR in order to further world peace and would not sacrifice these hopes to achieve a conservative merger.

Spokesmen for both Yoshida and Ogata have made it equally clear that Japan's survival depends on maintaining the closest possible ties with the free world, and that Hatoyama's "two-faced" policies are jeopardizing its relationship.

Comment: While Hatoyama continues to emphasize Japan's basic ties with the United States, it is clear that his objective is to demonstrate to the Japanese people and to his own party that they can have their cake and eat it too.

Important elements in Hatoyama's party apparently have doubts as to the advisability of the premier's foreign policy. Presumably, however, they will not take the initiative to repudiate the policy until Soviet and American reactions are apparent.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

2. Viet Minh reported willing to be patient on unification:

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[REDACTED] Two Viet Minh delegates at the Bandung conference denied that the Viet Minh would fight its way south if elections were not

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held in 1956, [REDACTED] One of the delegates said, "Unlike the Americans, we have plenty of patience and we can wait."

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The Viet Minh officials, as well as Wilfred Burchett, the London Daily Worker's correspondent who was present, said the United States would make every effort to delay the elections. Burchett added that this was one election that could be held on the British model since the Communists would have no trouble winning it.

Comment: Viet Minh propaganda repeatedly insists the terms of the Geneva agreement must be strictly adhered to and lays chief blame on the United States for alleged attempts to sabotage the agreement.

Apart from frequent assurances that Vietnam will indeed be unified, the Viet Minh in its propaganda has not threatened the use of force.


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WESTERN EUROPE

4. French Communists may gain some Socialist support for united action:



The French Communist Party is increasingly persistent in calls for unity of action with the Socialists, despite vigorous rebuffs by top Socialist leaders, and the American embassy in Paris doubts if

Socialist Party organizations on a local level can indefinitely resist these appeals.

Communist leader Duclos called on 9 May for an early meeting of the two parties to consider a program of opposition to the laws for government aid to church schools. This may be a Communist attempt to prevent co-operation between the Socialists and the Popular Republicans and at the same time to bid for Radical Socialist support.

Comment: The Communist overture to the Socialists on 18 April for mutual support in the cantonal elections had some success on the local level.

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The Communists are emphasizing economic and social issues to regain support lost through the party's concentration on Soviet foreign policy interests, especially opposition to German rearmament. The renewed pressure on the Socialists may also be designed, however, to counteract Mendes-France's attempt to establish the basis for a left-of-center coalition majority in the next National Assembly.

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7. Comment on combined Soviet bloc military command:

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The Warsaw agreement of 14 May provides for creation of the much-publicized combined military command for the USSR and its East European Satellites.

The location of the headquarters at Moscow and the appointment of Konev as commander will provide firm Soviet control over its day-to-day operations. Creation of a permanent staff, composed of representatives of the general staffs of the participating countries, will be an administrative improvement over the present Soviet system of bilateral control over Satellite military activities. The text obscures, however, an apparently unwieldy command relationship among Konev and the Satellite defense ministers, each of whom will act as or appoint a deputy to Konev.

The agreement implies that not all Soviet bloc military units will be allocated to "the complement of the joint armed forces." A provision for the disposition of forces in

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the territory of participating countries "in accordance with the demands of mutual defense" is probably the expected legal justification for indefinite retention of Soviet forces in East Europe.

East Germany's release from providing armed forces to the joint command until an unspecified future date is probably motivated by a desire not only to avoid furnishing immediate justification for West German rearmament but also to be in a position to continue strenuous objections to it. Also the formal creation of an East German army would have dashed German hopes for unification, and probably would have created an unnecessary obstacle to possible direct negotiations between East and West Germany.

The failure to announce officially the creation of an East German army is probably intended as another hint that Moscow is interested in entering into negotiations for a settlement of the German problem.

The dovetailing of recent Soviet tactics on Austria, Germany, and Yugoslavia reflects a major effort to encourage Western speculation that the present Soviet leaders want a neutral belt which would include Germany. [REDACTED]

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